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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE 
VALLEY, INC., a corporation, 
Appellant, 
v. 
SECURITIES COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH; HAL S. BEN-
NETT, DONALD HACKING, STEW-
ART M. HANSON, Commissioners 
of the Securities Commission of the 
State of Utah; and M. H. LOVE, Di-
rector, Securities Commission of the 
State of Utah, Respondents, 
v. 
FUNERAL DIRECTORS AND EM-
BALMERS ASSOCIATION OF 
UTAH, a corporation, Intervener. 
Case No. 
8468 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment brought 
under the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 33, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
No issue of fact is involved. The parties, through their 
counsel, stipulated to an agreed statement of facts (R. 18-
24) . The statement discloses essentially the following facts: 
Appellant is a Utah corporation organized for profit. It 
owns a parcel of land in Salt L~ke County, Utah, embracing 
71.5 acres, which it has dedicated as a cemetery and is now 
engaged in the development and operation of this property 
for such purposes. In the development of this cemetery 
and the sale of lots therein, the lot purchaser signs a pro-
posed contract together with a written statement in the 
form of the instruments shown at R. 21 and R. 23. Upon 
approval of the statement and the form of contract as signed 
by the purchaser, appellant signs and delivers the contract 
to the purchaser. Upon payment of the stipulated purchase 
price and funds for perpetual care, appellant delivers a 
deed to the burial space in the form of the instrument shown 
at R. 22. 
The contract among other things requires appellant to 
design and construct a garden or gardens, to expend certain 
funds for development, to provide for care and mainten-
ance and to issue a deed upon payment of the lot purchase 
price and the funds for perpetual care. 
Salesmen for appellant in selling burial spaces explain 
to the purchaser the proposed plan of development of the 
cemetery and that the burial spaces will increase in value 
as the development is carried out. The statement signed 
by the purchaser, however, contains provisions that the 
property is being acquired for burial purposes only and not 
for investment or speculative purposes and that appellant 
does not agree or promise to resell the lot purchased. 
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3 
The deed identifies the burial space purchased and 
contains a certificate by the appellant as grantor that 
pursuant to the contract, appellant has placed certain funds 
in trust, the income from which shall be used for the care, 
maintenance and protection of the cemetery. 
Other cemeteries in the State of Utah sell burial spaces 
under contracts and deeds similar to those of the appellant. 
Some, but not all cemeteries provide for perpetual care of 
the cemetery grounds and burial spaces. Of the cemeteries 
providing for perpetual care, some establish a fund either 
voluntarily by their charter, or by agreement with the 
purchasers of the burial spaces. None of such cemeteries 
other than Aultorest Memorial Corporation has registered 
its contracts, deeds or other instruments similar to the 
contract and deed of appellant as a security with the Secur-
ities Commission of Utah. The contract of Aultorest Mem-
orial Corporation registered as a security is in the form 
of the instrument shown at R. 24. The Aultorest agreement 
in addition to providing for the sale of a burial space em-
bodies provisions for a burial contract or a burial certificate. 
No such provision is contained in the contract or deed of 
appellant. 
The question presented here is whether the contract 
and deed of appellant are a security within the provisions 
of Section 61-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The trial 
court, on the basis of the facts presented, held that these 
instruments are a security. From such determination, this 
appeal is taken. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
I. 
THE CONTRACT AND DEED ARE NOT A 
SECURITY AS DEFINED BY THE UTAH 
STATUTE. 
(a) The instruments are not within the express 
definition of the statute. 
(b) The instruments are not commonly known 
as a security. 
II. 
THE ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER 11, LAWS 
OF UTAH, 1955, REMOVES ANY PUBLIC 
NEED OR POLICY FOR CONSTRUING THE 
CONTRACT AND DEED AS A SECURITY. 
ARGUMENT 
There is no suggestion in this case that appellant is 
engaged in promoting or carrying out any fraudulent 
scheme or plan. Sale of lots are made by appellant for 
burial purposes in the usual course of its business. No 
representations are made that purchase of lots should be 
undertaken as an attractive speculation or as a means of 
reaping profits but on the other hand the buyer is required 
to sign a statement that the purchase is made for burial 
purposes only. It is readily admitted that purchasers are 
informed that lots acquired in the early development of the 
cemetery will be more valuable as such development is car-
ried on and completed. This is a natural and necessary re-
sult from the development and beautification of a cemetery. 
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The cost of providing a resting place for human remains 
is one of the necessary and inescapable expenses of this 
existence. It is desirable and proper that this expense 
should be discharged at a moderate cost. If one may do 
so, by purchasing a lot in a cemetery under development, 
he should have an opportunity to do so. This is not a mat-
ter of embarking on a speculative venture or one entered 
into for profit but simply a case of exercising common 
sense in minimizing a necessary expenditure. 
The question as we see it here is therefore essentially 
one of whether a contract for the sale of a cemetery lot 
under which the cemetery agrees to perform certain duties 
with respect to the development of the cemetery, to care 
for and maintain the same and to create a fund to insure 
such care and maintenance coupled with a deed to the lot 
pursuant to the contract, constitutes a security under Utah 
law. 
I. 
THE CONTRACT AND DEED ARE NOT A 
SECURITY AS DEFINED BY THE UTAH 
STATUTE. 
The controlling statute here is Section 61-1-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. It has two general features. It 
includes by express definition certain instruments which 
are a security and then has a general provision including 
any other instrument commonly known as a security. In 
the presentation of the problem we think it orderly, there-
fore, to consider the two features of the statute. 
(a) The instruments are not within the express 
definition of the statute. 
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Section 61-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which de-
fines a security, provides as follows: 
"(1) 'Security' shall include any note, stock, 
treasury stock, bond, debenture or evidence of in-
debtedness; certificate of interest or participation 
or certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agree-
ment; certificate of, contract for, or any conveyance 
or other instrument conveying, representing, or pur-
porting to convey or represent, an interest or any 
right in, to or under any oil, gas or mining lease or 
permit; collateral trust certificate, preorganization 
certificate, or preorganization subscription; any 
transferable share, investment contract, service cer-
tificate, burial certificate or burial contract; invest-
ment-trust certificates, shares or units, or beneficial 
interest in or title to property, profits or earnings; 
certificate of membership in, contract or agreement 
given, made or issued by, any corporation, associa-
tion or organization wherein a discount, reduction 
in price or other advantage, privilege or right in or 
to the purchase of merchandise are held out or 
agreed to be given or made ; and any other instru-
ment commonly known as a security, including any 
plan or scheme wherein townsites, town lots, or acre-
age, or any other land division in fee or in leasehold 
shall be used in connection with the gift or sale of 
any security as herein defined." 
All of the instruments expressly identified above under the 
facts involved in this case, with the exception of one cate-
gory may, we believe, be dismissed as being inapplicable to 
the case at bar. The classification "any transferable share, 
investment contract, service certificate, burial certificate 
or burial contract" requires some further consideration. 
Under the facts of this case where the purchaser must 
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expressly agree that he acquires the property for burial 
purpose only and not for investment or speculative purposes 
with the understanding that the appellant does not promise 
or agree to resell the lot purchased, we think the contract 
and deed must clearly not be considered to be an invest-
ment contract. These instruments are not a service certifi-
cate because the covenants of appellant relate only to obli-
gations with respect to the development, preservation and 
care of the cemetery property. They do not extend any 
services to an individual. An examination of the contract 
and deed will disclose that there are no provisions therein 
for the funeral or burial of a decedent. In this respect the 
contract under investigation is to be distinguished from 
that of Aultorest Memorial Corporation (R. 24) which 
contains such provisions. It is for this reason that registra-
tion as a security was required in the case of the Aultorest 
contract, but not in the case of the contract and deed under 
investigation. 
It therefore appears to us that the instruments under 
investigation do not fall within the specific definitions of 
the statute and if within its terms must be within the des-
ignation of "any other instrument commonly known as a 
security". 
(b) The instruments are not commonly known 
as a security. 
If the instruments involved here are not included in 
the express definitions of the statute, then in order to be 
within its terms they must be commonly known as a secur-
ity. 
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Deferring for a moment the consideration of cases 
which have involved this problem, and approaching it from 
the standpoint of the business man, there would seem to be 
little doubt that the purchase of a cemetery lot for burial 
purposes would not be regarded as an investment for profit 
or commonly considered as a security. 
It is common knowledge that cemeteries which have 
no provision for care and maintenance may become most 
depressing and unsightly areas. Provisions in contracts 
covering the purchase of cemetery lots and in deeds for 
the conveyance of the same which are designed to insure 
care should be in the interest of the individuals involved 
as well as the public generally and should not, in our judg-
ment, have any real bearing on the question of whether the 
instruments are commonly known as a security. 
Courts in many cases have had occasion to define the 
words "security" or "securities". For our purposes here 
we deem it unnecessary to cite numerous authorities. The 
subject was carefully considered in Equitable Trust Co. v. 
Marshall, 17 A. 2d 13, (Delaware) where the Court at page 
15 said: 
"Strictly and technically, the word 'security', 
when used in connection with matters of a pecuniary 
nature, may, perhaps, mean 'that which renders a 
matter sure; an instrument which renders certain 
the performance of a contract'. 2 Bouv. Law Diet., 
Rawle's Third Rev., p. 3032. In discussing the mean-
ing of that word, the statement is made in Black's 
Law Dictionary that 'the term is usually applied to 
an obligation, pledge, mortgage, deposit, lien, etc., 
given by a debtor to make sure the payment or per-
formance of his debt by furnishing the creditor with 
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the resource to be used in case of failure in the 
principal obligation'. Strictly construed, originally 
the kindred word 'securities' was, therefore, primar-
ily 'a general term for written assurances for pay-
ment of money; evidences of debt.' Abbott's Law 
Diet. In other words, the strict primary meaning of 
that word was at one time confined to a secured ob-
ligation or promise to pay of some nature, and did 
not include either corporate stocks or mere deben-
tures. Scott on Trusts, 1228; Restatement Law of 
Trusts, Vol. 1, p. 657; In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 
763, 291 N. Y. S. 697. But at the present day, by 
common usage, the word 'securities', though stand-
ing alone and unaided by the context of the instru-
ment in which it is used, has acquired a broader and 
more general meaning, and is frequently used as 
synonymous with words which originally may have 
had quite a different meaning. Fidelity Union Trust 
Co. v. Lowy, 123 N. J. Eq. 90, 196 A. 369; In re 
Vanderbilt's Estate, 132 Misc. 150, 229 N.Y. S. 631; 
City Bank Farmers Trust Co·. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 
384, 189 A. 178 ; 2 Schouler on Wills, 6th Ed., 1228 ; 
56 C. J. 1279, 1282. In this connection, Mr. Schouler 
aptly says: 'Present usage gives (to that word) a 
generous scope far beyond its literal meaning'. 2 
Schouler on Wills, 6th Ed., 1288, supra. Modern 
dictionaries have recognized this change in the 
meaning of the word 'securities,' and have defined 
it as 'an evidence of debt or of property as a bond, 
a stock certificate or other instrument, etc. ; a docu-
ment giving the holder the right to demand and 
receive property not in his possession'. \Vebster's 
New Inter. Diet.; 7 Cent. Diet. 5460. Most courts 
and text writers have, therefore, held that certifi-
cates for shares of corporate stock are 'securities,' 
notwithstanding the fact that they merely represent 
the particular interest of the owner in the corporate 
capital and' in its surplus assets on dissolution. Fi-
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delity Union Trust Co. v. Lowy, 123 N. J. Eq. 90, 
196 A. 369; In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 132 Misc. 
150, 229 N. Y. S. 631; In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 
763, 291 N. Y. S. 697; City Bank Farmer's Trust 
Co. v. Lewis, 122 Conn. 384, 189 A. 178; Scott on 
Trusts 1228; Restatement Law of Trusts, Vol. 1, p. 
697. This is conceded by the residuary devisees and 
legatees. Moreover, in reaching that conclusion, 
courts have necessarily and logically recognized the 
fact that in the ordinary vocabulary of modern life, 
the term 'securities' is usually applied to almost any 
instrument which is used for the purpose of financ-
ing and promoting a business enterprise of some 
nature, and which is intended as an investment of a 
pecuniary nature. In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763, 
291 N. Y. S. 697; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Lowy, 
123 N. J. Eq. 90, 196 A. 369; In re McGraw's Estate, 
337 P. 93, 10 A. 2d 377; In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 
132 Misc. 150, 229 N. Y. S. 631; 56 C. J. 1279; see, 
also, Romer, L. J., In re Rayner (1904) 1 Ch. 176. 
But that term does not ordinarily apply to the evi-
dence of title to land, as such, or to any share or 
interest therein. Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sandf. Ch. 
494; Pratt v. Worrell, 66 N. J. Eq. 194, 57 A. 450; 
Narragansett Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Burnham, 51 R.I. 
371, 154 A. 909; First Nat. Bank v. Rawson, 56 Ohio 
App. 388, 11 N. E. 2d 110; Senior v. Braden, 295 U. 
S. 422, 55 S. Ct. 800, 79 L. Ed. 1520, 100 A. L. R. 
794." 
In considering the definition of the word "securities" 
in relation to the Blue Sky Law, the Court in Prohaska v. 
Hemmer-Miller Development Co., 256 Ill. App. 331, held 
that: 
The term "securities" as used in the Blue Sky 
Law means written assurances for the return or pay-
ment of money except where specific definitions are 
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given by the statute, and it means the investment 
of funds in a designated portion of the assets and 
capital of a concern with a view of receiving a profit 
through the efforts of others than the investors. 
Turning to the precise question of instruments involv-
ing the sale and purchase of cemetery lots, the general rule 
is stated in 79 C. J. S. Security; Securities, page 949 as 
follows: 
"* * * A conveyance of a cemetery lot, or a 
certificate granting the right of burial in such a lot, 
ordinarily is not regarded as a security since usually 
it is not considered to be an investment, and is an 
interest in real estate, but when such interests be-
come the subjects of speculation in connection with 
the cemetery enterprise the courts have held such 
conveyances or certificates to be securities." 
An annotation on the subject is found in 163 A. L. R. 
1075, where the editor states substantially the same rule 
thus: 
"While undoubtedly documents purporting to 
convey or vest an interest in a cemetery lot for the 
use of the purchaser or his family would not be 
classified as 'securities' under most 'blue sky laws,' 
it has been held under the circumstances involved 
in some cases that instruments relating to the sale 
of such lots to a buyer expecting profits from their 
subsequent resale constituted 'securities' subject to 
regulation." 
The cases cited in C. J. S. and included in the A. L. R. 
annotation substantially support the rule as stated. The 
case of State v. Lorentz, 22 N. W. 2d 313 (Minn.) is the 
most recent on the subject which we have been able to find. 
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In that case where cemetery lots were being sold on a 
wholesale basis, for speculative purposes, the majority of 
the court determined that the sale of such lots was a secur-
ity under Minnesota law. The Court in doing so, however, 
at page 316 of the report pointed out that: 
"* * * where burial lots are sold in the 
usual course for burial purposes, the statute of 
course does not apply." 
The phrase "any other instrument commonly known 
as a security" appears to have been brought into the Utah 
Code by the provisions of Section 2, Chapter 87, Laws of 
Utah, 1925. We have been unable to find any decision of 
this Court defining this phase. So far as we have been able 
to determine, no contract for the sale of a cemetery lot or 
deed in connection therewith in the form of the instruments 
involved here has been registered as a security in this 
jurisdiction. In making this statement we are not unmind-
ful of the Aultorest contract attached to the agreed state-
ment. That contract, however, as we have observed, has 
express provisions for a burial contract or burial certifi-
cate which brings it within the express definition of our 
statute. 
In the thirty years which have passed since the enact-
ment of said Chapter 87, Laws of Utah, 1925, without any 
regulation under the Securities Act, thousands of cemetery 
lots must have been sold in this state under contracts em-
bodying provisions for perpetual care. A practice so long 
employed is persuasive of the view that such instruments 
have not been commonly known as a security. 
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Tested by the rule stated above, the facts in this case, 
it seems to us, compel the conclusion that the contract and 
deed under investigation here are not a security within the 
meaning of our statute. 
II. 
THE ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER 11, LAWS 
OF UTAH, 1955, REMOVES ANY PUBLIC 
NEED OR POLICY FOR CONSTRUING THE 
CONTRACT AND DEED AS A SECURITY. 
The legislature by the enactment of Chapter 11, Laws 
of Utah, 1955, made comprehensive provisions for the oper-
ation, maintenance, and regulation of all cemeteries within 
this state except those operated by religious and fraternal 
organizations, and by cities and towns and other political 
subdivisions. 
Without considering the Act in detail, an examination 
of its provisions will show that it is intended thereby to 
bring cemeteries within the Department of Registration in 
the Department of Business Regulation, and to subject such 
institutions and their operations to stringent regulations, 
particularly with respect to the creation and maintenance 
of their endowment funds, and to require the procurement 
of an annual certificate of authority for the conduct of a 
cemetery operation. 
The legislature concluded that the operation of ceme-
teries, other than those excluded from the Act, should be 
placed under careful regulation. We have no quarrel with 
that conclusion. The legislature further concluded that the 
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appropriate agency to administer such regulation is the 
Department of Registration within the Department of Bus-
iness Regulation. No amendment was made of said Section 
61-1-4 and no provision is found indicating that any regis-
tration or regulation is to be administered by the Securities 
Commission. 
Having vested jurisdiction of these institutions in one 
branch of the Department of Business Regulation, we think 
the legislature wisely and properly concluded that they 
should not be subjected to regulation by another branch of 
the same department. The confusion and possible conflicts 
which might result from such dual control are obvious. The 
provisions of said Chapter 11 for close supervision and 
control of cemeteries, coupled with those for an annual 
certificate of authority, and for revocation or suspension 
of such authority upon violation of any of the provisions 
of the Act, afford adequate protection to the public. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Trial Court construing the con-
tract and deed of appellant to be a security should be re-
versed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. N. CORN,VALL, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
• 
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